since less patient consumers prefer the resources to be extracted faster than the more patient consumers. The resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. Our approach to voting in a dynamic framework is borrowed from Borissov et al. (2010) * . We prove that in the model with common property it is the discount factor of the median voter that determines the long-run resource utilization rate and the long-run rate of growth. It is interesting to notice that the latter does not depend on the discount factor of the most patient consumers.
It follows that the long-run rate of growth in the case of private ownership of natural resources is less than or equal to the long-run rate of growth in the case of common ownership. However, this conclusion is subject to some reservations. More specifically, we show that if discount factors are endogenous, under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is devoted to the model with private property to resources. We define equilibrium paths, fully characterize steadystate equilibria and derive an explicit formula for the equilibrium rate of growth. In section 2, we develop the model with common resource stocks, describe our approach to voting, characterize steady state voting equilibria and derive a formula the the long-run rate of growth. In section 3, we modify our models by introducing endogenous time preferences.
1. Economic growth model with private ownership of resource stocks
Consumers
Suppose that there is an odd number L of consumers. The consumers live for an infinite period of time and are identical in all respect except their discount factors. Each time each consumer supply one unit of labor force in the labor market. Thus the total labor supply at each time is L.
The utility function of consumer i is of the form
where β i is the discount factor of this consumer and C i,t is his consumption at time t. We assume that u(C) = ln C. * The performance of majoritarian institutions in dynamic settings has attracted growing interest and attention in recent years (see e.g. Baron (1996) ; Krusell et al. (1997) ; Cooley and Soares (1999) ; Rangel (2003) ; Bernheim and Slavov (2009) ). Without going into detail, notice that our approach to voting is different from the approaches accepted in these papers.
We suppose the households to be sorted in ascending order of their discount factors:
By J we denote the set of agents with the highest discount factor:
The budget constraints of consumer i are of the following form
Here r t and W t are the interest and wage rates at time t, and S i,t are the savings of consumer i at time t. Consumers are prohibited to borrow against their future wage earnings. Therefore, their savings must be non-negative. They can be invested in physical capital as well as in natural resources. According to Hotelling's rule (Hotelling (1931) , see also Stiglitz (1974) ) the return to the investments into phisical capital and into natural resources must be equal in equilibrium. Hence, the resource price P t in equilibrium grows at the rate r t :
Initially consumer i is supposed to be endowed with some amount of physical capitalK i,0 and some amount of natural resourcesR i,0 which are assumed to be given. Therefore at the initial time t = 0 the savings of consumer i are S i,−1 = P −1Ri,0 +K i,0 ≥ 0 where P −1 is the price of natural resources at time t = −1.
Production
We assume that output Y t at each time t is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A t is the coefficient of total factor productivity, K t is the physical capital stock at time t, L is the labor supply, and E t is the volume of extraction of exhaustible resources. Capital fully depreciates during one time period. The total factor productivity grows at an exogenously given rate λ:
The resources expended for production decrease their available stock:
We denote by ρ t the resource extraction rate: ρ t = E t /R t , so that E t = ρ t R t .
Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
Suppose that we are given an initial state represented by an initial distribution of physical capital K i,0 i=1,...,L and natural resources R i,0 i=1,...,L among the consumers. We assume thatK
and define an equilibrium path starting from the initial state
as a sequence
is a solution to the following problem:
2) capital is paid its marginal product:
3) labor is paid its marginal product:
4) the price of exhaustible resources is equal to their marginal product:
, t = 0, 1, . . . ; 5) Hotelling's rule holds true:
6) total consumer savings are equal to the investments into physical capital and exhaustible resources
7) the natural balance of exhaustible resources is fulfilled
where R * 0 =R 0 .
We make our emphasis on steady-state equilibria. They are defined as follows.
is called a steady-state equilibrium if the sequence
given for t = 0, 1, . . . and i = 1, . . . , L by
is an equilibrium path for some initial state. Suppose that for some r, I, γ,
We call a couple C * i , S * i a balanced optimum of consumer i if the sequence
given by
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if
(1 + γ
1
and, for each i = 1, . . . , L, the couple C * i , S * i is a balanced optimum of consumer i at r = r * , γ = γ * , and I = W * . To describe properties of steady-state equilibria we formulate the following simple lemma. Lemma 1. Given r, I, and γ, 1) a balanced optimum of consumer i exists if and only if
2) if
is a balanced optimum of consumer i;
3) if
then there is a unique balanced optimum of consumer i, C * i , S * i ; it is given by C * i = I, S * i = 0. Now we can formulate an important proposition describing the structure of steady-state equilibria. It follows from Lemma 1.
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions (4)- (8) and
To prove this proposition it is sufficient to repeat a well-known argument by Becker (1980 Becker ( , 2006 . It allows us to note the following:
• The equilibrium resource extraction rate is determined by the patience of the most patient consumers:
The more patient are these consumers, the lower is the resource extraction rate.
• The growth rate is determined by the rate of technological change and the discount factor of the most patient consumer
The higher is patience of the most patient consumers, the higher is the growth rate.
Economic growth model with common ownership of resources
In this section we propose a model of economic growth with heterogeneous agents and common resource stocks. The income obtained from the sale of the exhaustible resource is equally distributed among the consumers. Consumers choose resource extraction rate by voting. We describe equilibrium paths in the basic Ramsey-type model and after that introduce voting procedure and define voting equilibrium. We maintain our earlier assumptions and rewrite the budget constraints (1) of consumer i as follows
Here r t is the interest time t, and S i,t are the savings of consumer i at time t invested in physical capital. Consumer's income includes the wage W t and resource income Ω t , which is the per capita income from the sale of the extracted resource equally distributed among the consumers.
Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
As in section 1.3, first we define equilibrium paths. Suppose that a sequence R = (ρ t ) ∞ t=0 of resource extraction rates is given. The initial state is given by a tuple of initial savings Ŝ i,−1 i=1,...,L such that
and the initial stock of exhaustible resourceR 0 > 0. We define an equilibrium path starting from the initial state Ŝ i,−1 i=1,...,L ,R 0 as a sequence
such that 1) for each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence C * * i,t , S * * i,t t=0,1,...
is a solution to problem (3) at r t = r * *
2) aggregate savings are equal to the capital stock
3) capital is paid its marginal product:
4) labor is paid its marginal product:
5) the resource income is given by
6) the price of the exhaustible resources is equal to their marginal product
7) the extraction of resource is determined by
8) the natural balance of exhaustible resource is fulfilled
where R * * 0 =R 0 . To describe steady-state equilibria suppose that the resource extraction rate is constant over time:
is an equilibrium path. Here we do not suppose that Hotelling's rule holds true. Under some circumstances it may be that π * * r * * .
It is clear that for any constant over time resource extraction rate, ρ, a tuple
and, for each i = 1, . . . , L, the couple C * * i , S * * i is a balanced optimum of consumer i at r = r * * , γ = γ * * , and I = W * * + Ω * * .
Lemma 1 can be readily applied to the model under consideration. The following proposition describing the structure of steady-state equilibrium follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. Let a constant over time resource extraction rate, ρ, be given. A tuple
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions (9)- (14) and
This proposition can be proved in the same way as Proposition 2. It says that only the most patient consumers make positive savings and own all the capital.
Voting equilibria
Here we introduce a voting procedure into our model. Consider an equilibrium path
..,L t=0,1,... and ask each consumer i, weather he prefers to increase or decrease the resource extraction rate ρ t at time t. We assume that when answering this question consumers take into account the fact that additional resource extracted at time t can be sold, used for production and possibly increase their consumption via corresponding part of the resource rent and via increase of factors income. On the other hand, the resource utilized at time t decrease the resource stock available in the future.
To describe consumers' decision-making, first note that for each i, (C * * i,t , S * * i,t ) t=0,1,... is a solution to the following problem:
where S i,−1 =Ŝ i,−1 . Recall that E * * t = ρ t R * * t and hence R * *
Let us consider the value of (18), V i , as a function of R = (ρ t ) ∞ t=0 . Defining consumers' decision-making procedure we assume that the attitude of consumer i to a possible change in ρ t is determined by sign of the derivative ∂V i / ∂ρ t , if it exists. Namely, if ∂V i / ∂ρ t > 0, consumer i is in favor of increasing ρ t . If ∂V i / ∂ρ t < 0, consumer i is in favor of decreasing ρ t . Definition 1. We call a sequence ρ is an equilibrium path at R = (ρ * * t ) ∞ t=0 and for each t the number of consumers who are in favor of increasing ρ t and the number of those who are in favor of decreasing ρ t is less than L/2.
Here we certainly do not mean that the individuals votes for any change in the resource extraction rate. The idea is that the government controlling the resource stock responds somehow to the wishes of the majority when choosing the resource extraction rate.
We will not discuss an existence and properties of voting equilibria in a general form, but will describe voting steady-state equilibria.
Definition 2. If the sequence
Also we have
To complete the proof it is sufficient to notice that
It follows that
• The long-run equilibrium resource extraction rate is determined by the patience of the median consumer:
• Hotelling's rule Hotelling (1931) , implying that the resource prices grow with the rate equal to the interest rate π * * = r * * may be violated:
Indeed, if β m < β max , then π * * is larger than the interest rate r * * . See Chermak and Patrick (2002) for a discussion of Hotelling's rule applicability to observable price dynamics.
• The long-run rate of growth is determined by the rate of technological change and the patience of the median consumer
It is interesting to note that the discount factor of the most patient consumers β max does not influence the steady state rate of growth though it impacts the interest rate.
Endogenous time preferences
It seems reasonable to make the conclusion from our results that in all conditions private ownership of exhaustible resources is more favorable for economic growth than common ownership. However, this conclusion is somewhat hasty. The point is that private ownership, other thing being equal, leads to higher level of income inequality than common ownership. At the same time, it is generally recognized (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996) ) that income inequality, by fuelling social discontent, increases sociopolitical instability and insecurity of property rights and the latter, by creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, can reduce investment and economic growth. Thus, if private ownership of natural resources leads to a high level of income inequality, it can result in sociopolitical instability and hence in a higher rate of resource extraction † and a lower rate of growth than common ownership.
To model this possibility, let us slightly modify our model and, following Borissov and Lambrecht (2009) , make the assumption that the discount factors are formed endogenously. More precisely, let us assume that the objective function of consumer i is of the following form:
t u(C i,t ), † Similar reasoning on the impact of the insecurity of property rights on the extraction rate can be found Gaddy and Ickes (2005) .
where p is a social objective magnitude reflecting a detrimental effect of social tension, political instability and insecurity of property rights on the economy. We assume p = ψ(η), where η is a measure of income inequality and ψ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous function equal to 0 at η smaller than somê η > 0 and increasing for η >η. It should be noticed that on a non-balanced equilibrium path the income inequality and p change over time. However, on a balanced-growth path they are constant over time. On a balanced-growth path the income distribution depends on the fraction σ = |J|/N of the most patient consumers in the population and the distribution of savings across the set of most patient consumers. To simplify our argument, let us restrict our consideration to the simple case where the savings across the most patient consumers are distributed evenly. In this case it is natural to take the following measure of income inequality:
where α = α 1 in the case of common ownership of natural resources and α = α 1 + α 3 in the case of private ownership of natural resources. It is not difficult to check that α(1 − σ) is a good approximation to the Gini coefficient of income inequality and is equal to the latter if the set of consumers is a continuum. It is not difficult to check that if we assume that η = α(1 − σ) and hence p = ψ[α(1 − σ)], then, in the case of private ownership of exhaustible resources the equilibrium long-run rate of growth, γ * , is determined by
and in the case of common ownership the equilibrium long-run rate of growth, γ * * , is given by
One can readily see that if the median voter is patient, β m = β max , and inequality under the private property regime is sufficiently high, (α 1 + α 3 )(1 − σ) >η, then common ownership leads to a higher equilibrium rate of growth than private ownership. If β m < β max , the possibility that private ownership results in a higher rate of growth is more likely for lower values of the ratio between the discount factors of the median and the most patient consumers, β max /β m , and for lower elasticity of output in the input of natural resources, α 3 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed two Ramsey-type models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in their intertemporal preferences, which leads to different preferences on the rate of resource extraction.
The first model assumes private ownership of the resource stocks. As one would expect, under the private property regime in the long run all capital and natural resources are owned by the most patient consumers, who determine the long-run rate of extraction and the long-run rate of growth.
The second model assumes the resource stocks to be collectively owned and the resource rent to be equally divided among all the consumers. The consumers choose the resource extraction rate by voting. For this model we have introduced a notion of voting equilibrium and fully characterized steady-state voting equilibria. In particular, we have shown that the long-run extraction rate and the long-run rate of growth are determined by the discount factor of the median consumer. Somewhat unexpectedly, the long-run rate of growth does not depend on the discount factor of the most patient consumers.
It follows that if the median consumer belongs to the set of the most patient consumers, the rates of growth under the two regimes are equal, and if the median discount factor is lower than that of the most patient consumers, the long-run rate of growth under the private property regime is higher than under the common property regime. However, this conclusion is no longer true if the discount factors are formed endogenously because, as we have shown, in that case under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private property.
